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Federal Courts of Appeals: Radical
Surgery or Conservative Care
By QUENTIN N. BURDICK*
The Federal Courts of Appeals are afficted with an illness.
While it is not malignant, there is a potential prognosis of chronic
incapacity or partial paralysis. The possible treatment, depend-
ing upon the physician, may be either radical or conservative.
The thrust of this paper is to offer a basis for a differential
diagnosis.
The symptoms of the illness are familiar to all who are
interested in judicial administration. The number of new appeals
filed has increased each year at an alarming rate. Each year
the number of appeals terminated has been less than the new
matters filed. The number of appeals pending has increased to
the point that as of June 30, 1971, it stood at 9,232. Thus, at the
1971 rate of terminations, the circuit courts would have to work
nine months just to eliminate the backlog from the preceding
year.' The following table graphically summarizes the situation
over the past decade.2
Alarming as these statistics may be, the prognosis is even more
guarded. According to a forecast made by the Federal Judicial
Center, the number of new case filings at the district court level
will reach 350,000 cases by 1990 if the trend of filings for the
1968-1970 period continues. The Center estimates that 1,129
district judges would be required to handle such a caseload.3
Postulating the same ratio of circuit judges to district judges as
now exists, about 250 circuit judges would be needed by 1990.
* United States Senator from North Dakota; Chairman, Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary;
member of the North Dakota Bar, B.A., University of Minnesota, 1931; LL.B.
University of Minnesota, 1932.
1 It should be noted, however, that a case is not ready for submission when
the appeal is filed. But preparation of the record, briefs and calendar administration
require only 124 days under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2 This table appears on page 808 and was taken from the DmEcroR OF THE
ArmnmSTRATnVE OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATEs CounTs ANNuAL REPORT (1971),
Table 2, at 99.
3 FEDEm JunscIAL CENTER, TimD Mmi-Yman RPORT 16 (March, 1971).
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TABLE No. I
APPEALS FILED, TEBmINATED, AND PENDING IN TBE UNrrE STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS FIscAL YEARS 1962 Timoumc 1971
Increase
Number of Appeals in ap-
Fiscal judgeships as Termi- Pending peals
Year of June 30 Filed nated June 30 pending
1962 78 4,823 4,167 3,031 656
1963 78 5,437 5,011 3,457 426
1964 78 6,023 5,700 3,780 323
1965 78 6,766 5,771 4,775 995
1966 88 7,183 6,571 5,387 612
1967 88 7,903 7,527 5,763 376
1968 97 9,116 8,264 6,615 852
1969 97 10,248 9,014 7,849 1,234
1970 97 11,662 10,699 8,812 963
1971 97 12,788 12,368 9,232 420
Percent change
1971 over
1962 24.4 165.1 196.8 204.6
1971 over
1970 0.0 9.7 15.6 4.8
Thus, one can pose the problem: How to restructure an inter-
mediate federal court system so that it can accommodate, effi-
ciently and fairly, an increase in manpower from 97 to 250 judges
by 1990? Before a solution can be found to this critical problem,
a number of subsidiary propositions must be explored.
A. What is the Maximum Number of
Judges for a Court of Appeals?
There are some who say that nine is the maximum number of
judges which can be efficiently and fairly seated on such a court.
This is a position which was taken by a Special Committee on the
Geographical Organization of the Courts back in 1964. In a
report to the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Com-
mittee stated:
[Vol. 60
FEDEBAL COURT OF APPEALs
* .. that in its judgment nine is the maximum number of active
judgeship positions which can be allotted to a court of appeals
without impairing the efficiency of its operation and its unity
as a judicial institution.
4
The Judicial Conference itself took no position on this aspect
of the report of its special committee. Moreover, at least one
eminent student of the problem has criticized the notion that the
maximum number of judges should be nine.5 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals seems to be adhering to the
"nile of nine" even at this late date.6
The fact of the matter is that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
operate quite well with 15 and 13 judges, respectively. The
Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits now have nine judges each and
the Judicial Conference has recommended two additional judges
for the Second and one more for the Third.
Nor should it be supposed that 15 judges is a maximum per-
missible number. The Second Circuit with nine active judges
also has extensively used the services of 5 senior judges.7 The
Fifth Circuit, through the use of visiting judges, operated with
the equivalent of 7 additional, or 19 total, judges in fiscal year
1969."
If we must adhere to an arbitrary limitation of nine, it would
require 27 circuits to employ the 250 judges needed by 1990
assuming that we retain the present structure of the appellate
system. Even a twleve-judge limit would require over 20 circuits.
One can well imagine the amount of intercircuit disparity of
opinion which such a proliferation of circuits would induce.
The advocates of such an arbitrary limit to the number of
judges rely upon the argument that a court of appeals must
retain its "collegial" nature in the interest of efficiency, harmony
4 THE JUDiciAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE Pno-
CEEDINGS 15 (March, 1964).
SSee C. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administra-
tion, 42 TExAs L. REv. 949 (1964). In his analysis of the problem, Professor
Wright stated: "This is by no means to say that the larger the Court the better.
Clearly the fact is otherwise. But the problem is one of choosing among alterna-
tives." Id. at 973.
0 See Hearings on H.R. 7878 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 17, at 148 (1971) (letter of Judge Henry
J. Friendly).
SId. at 23 (testimony of Judge J. Edward Lumbard).
8 Id. at 93, Table 5.
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and quality. While these are vital characteristics of an appellate
court, it is submitted that an increase in judges beyond a sup-
posed maximum will neither destroy nor seriously impair effective
work by the court. In 1971, only 51 en banc hearings were held
in all Courts of Appeals, with 25 of them being held in the Third
and Fifth Circuits. At the present time, therefore, the collegial
aspect of these courts is maintained by devices other than sitting
en banc. Cases are heard and a tentative opinion arrived at by
only three judge divisions. Opinions are frequently drafted at
chambers located some distance from the place of hearing. Draft
opinions are circulated, usually by mail, among the three judges.
Some circuits also have a procedure for a wider circulation in
difficult or important cases. So it would seem that at the present
time the collegial nature of the court is preserved through
rotating assignment to divisions, by meetings, formal or informal,
at the place of hearing, and by periodic assembly of the entire
court at Judicial Council meetings and other special occasions.
On balance, it would seem that such a system for interchange of
views would still be possible were the number of judges to exceed
15, or even 20. Even though some dilution of esprit would result
from too large a number, it might be preferable to risking the
creation of parochial courts if, for example, a circuit were to
comprise only one state, or a part of a state.
B. Does Geographical Realignment Solve the Problem?
Circuit splitting is frequently mentioned as a solution to the
heavy workload in a particular circuit. Historically, only one new
circuit has been created since the Court of Appeals system was
created in 1891. In 1929, the Eighth Circuit was realigned into
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. In the 88th Congress, a bill was
introduced to split the Ninth Circuit, but the Judicial Conference
disapproved the proposal "at the present time,"9 and the bill was
not advanced legislatively. In 1964, the Special Committee on
the Geographic Organization of the Courts recommended a split
of the Fifth Circuit with the Mississippi River as the dividing
line. Although this proposal reportedly was desired by the judges
of that circuit, a storm of criticism arose. No bill was introduced.
9 THE JUDICIAL CONFFRENCE OF THE UNITED STATFs, supra note 4, at 14.
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While both of those circuits involve a large number of states,
the Second Circuit has yet another problem. The volume of
appellate business generated in the District Court of the Southern
District of New York is alone sufficient to justify, on a statistical
basis only, a separate circuit court of seven or more judges. Jokes
are made that a realignment of the Second Circuit could be made
by drawing a line across Manhattan at 42nd Street. But the joke
is almost a fact. In 1971, the Southern District of New York
generated 722 appeals, which is almost twice the total for the
First Circuit and more than either the Eighth or Tenth Circuits.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has
estimated the 1975 needs of the ten circuits as shown in the
following table. Thus, a split of the Fifth Circuit requirement of
TABLE No. 210
Cmcurr Cotmr JuDGEsmps











23 judges would create, theoretically, a twelve-judge circuit and an
eleven-judge circuit. The Ninth would yield two ten-judge circuits.
But the 1975 needs of a total of 128 judges are only about one-half
the needs arising from the Federal Judicial Center projections for
1990. It seems clear that were we to split circuits in the 1970's, we
would have to realign them again in the 1980's and 1990"s. While
such a process may be acceptable for legislative districts, it seems
intolerable for a judicial system. If we adopt a policy of circuit
splitting, the year 2021 may find a federal trial and appellate
10 See "Judgeships Needs in U.S. Courts of Appeals," a statistical study,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, February, 1971.
19721]
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL
system coextensive with state boundaries. This is a result which
should be avoided."
It is submitted that geographical realignment of the several
circuits is but a short range expedient, to be avoided unless it is
part of a long range solution.
C. Should Circuit Boundaries be Eliminated?
An alternative solution to the problems of the Courts of Ap-
peals which has been suggested involves the elimination of
boundaries between the circuits.- Apparently the suggestion
would involve a concept wherein there would be a single United
States Court of Appeals. All circuits would be abolished, and
through a central assignment office, calendars would be composed
both for judge sittings and appeal hearings. Cases would still be
heard by a panel of three judges. En bane review would be
accomplished either by en banc panels selected among the appel-
late judges or by a "super-circuit" or "court of review."
We know of no literature where this concept is fleshed out
beyond the skeleton outline set forth in the preceding paragraph.
However, the bare concept immediately raises a host of inquiries.
The administrative difficulties would seem to be considerable.
How will the central assignment office be constituted? Will that
office operate without judge control of and responsibility for its
operation? Will there be a need for some decentralized adminis-
trative function or are all briefs and records to be filed in the
central office? Will all appellate judges be rotated or assigned
to the three judge hearing panels, or will such rotation occur
only among those judges located within a decentralized region?
What effect does one or the other plan of rotation have upon the
travel time and travel expense involved? If we are to have 40
three-judge panels, how much disparity of opinion will result, and,
more important, how will it be resolved? For example, if the
judges on the 40 appellate panels were to entertain, and split
evenly, on a single question of national law, would we permit 5.
7, or 9 of their number to review the question en bane? Or must
11 See Professor Wright's suggestion that the major strength of the Courts of
Appeals lies in the fact that they are broad regional courts. Wright, supra note 5,
at 974-75.
12 Bus. WEEAK, Dec. 4, 1971, at 46.
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the question be resolved by the Supreme Court of the United
States which has a docket so crowded that it barely permits
jurisdiction based on disparity of opinion between lower tri-
bunals? If the Supreme Court or a new "court of review" cannot
adequately remove such disparity, will we be inviting panel-
shopping by adroit litigants?
Be these questions easy or difficult of resolution, there is, in
our opinion, an even greater disadvantage to the elimination of
circuit boundaries. The supervening obstacle arises from the fact
that the Courts of Appeals, divided as they are into circuits, are,
in fact, collegial courts. We have previously suggested that they
are not collegial in the sense that the judges collectively hear a
case, meet in conference for deliberation on the case, and join
together in handing down a decision. Such is not the situation,
except for the rare en banc case. On the other hand, these courts
are collegial in the sense that the judges of these courts collectively
must assume the responsibility for both the quantity and the
quality of justice dispensed within each of the circuits. They
collectively share the pride of accomplishment in coping with a
heavy calendar or in deciding difficult cases, and they collectively
must assume the responsibility if the end results of either effort
are found wanting. One need only look at the efforts made by the
judges of the Courts of Appeals of our most over-burdened circuits
to realize that pride and responsibility are important elements of
our judicial system. How then are those characteristics going to
be implanted in a system of 40 rotating panels of judges?
D. Can Structural Changes Accommodate More
Judges Within the Appellate System?
The burgeoning caseload of the Courts of Appeals has drawn
the attention of many legal scholars in the past 10 years. In the
mid-60's the American Bar Foundation commissioned a study
of the problem through a special task force. 3 In 1968 this group
issued a report 4 in which it recommended, inter alia, that certain
13 Professor Paul D. Carrington was the Project Director. Members of the
Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Bernard G. Segal, were Lindsey
Cowen, Charles S. Desmond, Nathan B. Goodnow, Leon Jaworski, David W.
Louisell, Thurgood Marshall, Carl McGowan and Paul J. Mishldn.14 Amr.UCAN B~An FOUNDATION, ACCOMODATING THE WOMKLOAD OF THE U.S.
CounTs OF APPEALS (1968).
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structural changes were necessary in order to permit the use of an
increased number of judges in the federal appellate system. Its
discussion of the basic problem of how to accommodate an
increased number of judges in the federal appellate system can
be summarized as follows:
1. Once a circuit reaches nine judges, the desirability of
adding more judges must be compared to the most direct
alternative, that of splitting a circuit to create a new circuit.
On balance, it is more desirable to add judges than it is to split
circuits.
2. When the number of judges in a given circuit exceeds
15, a "division" system should be adopted whereby judges
would be assigned on a rotating basis to 5 or 7 judge-divisions,
with each division having responsibility for specific substantive
subject matter. Up to 30 judges could be accommodated
within a given circuit under this "substantive divisions" con-
cept.
3. Eventually some circuits will have to split when the
caseload exceeds the capacity of the maximum number of
judges who can be efficiently employed under a "substantive
divisions" organization.
4. Contemporaneously in this evolutionary process there
will be the need to furnish assistance to the Supreme Court
in its function of guiding and harmonizing the federal law
decided by the Courts of Appeals. 15 Such assistance could be
furnished alternatively by regional appellate panels of the
Courts of Appeals, by appellate panels with jurisdiction over
specific subject matter, or by a "national circuit."
This report of the American Bar Foundation is noteworthy be-
cause it presents one approach to a long range solution to the
problems of the federal appellate system.
The recommendation for restructuring the Courts of Appeals
into "substantive divisions" has been analyzed in detail by Pro-
fessor Carrington. 6 A possibility for changes which will facilitate
the work of the Courts of Appeals and also assist the Supreme
1 A recent study indicates that the Courts of Appeals do, in fact, make the
final decision of national law in an overwhelming majority of cases due to the
inability of the Supreme Court to give a high priority to its conflict resolution
function. See Litigation Flow in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C., 2nd and
5th Circuits prepared by J. Woodford Howard, Jr., and delivered at a meeting
of the American Political Science Association, September, 1971.
16 Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 H~Av. L. REv. 542 (1969).
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Court was presented by Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler in her
Charles Evans Hughes address."
The American Bar Foundation study and the Carrington and
Hufstedler proposals are cited not by way of indicating their
acceptance but simply as illustrative of the structural changes
in our court system which must be considered in seeking a long
range solution to the problem.
The law explosion following the conclusion of World War II
was a concomitant of an increased population and an acceleration
in the socio-economic affairs of this nation. Neither factor can
reasonably be expected to decrease in the near future. While
decisions on what is a rational basis for federal jurisdiction are
required, such decisions will not eliminate the present problems
of our federal appellate courts. The volume of civil rights and
habeas corpus litigation of the past decade may well be exceeded
by consumer and ecological litigation in the next decade.
A responsive government must meet the needs of its populace
for elimination of inequities and excesses. If the redress of such
grievances requires judicial intervention, we must be certain that
the machinery of our courts will be adequate to the task. Cer-
tainty of such adequacy cannot be achieved through resort to
short term expediency. It can be achieved only by shaping a
long-range plan which will meet the needs of our appellate
system not only in 1975 but also in 1990. Hopefully, such a plan
will be flexible enough to meet the unforeseeable needs early in
the 21st century. It is the duty of all elements of the legal
profession-the bench, the bar, and the law schools-to help
fashion such a plan. It is the responsibility of the Congress to
ultimately approve the most feasible of the alternative choices, or
combination of choices, available.
We here offer no prescription for temporary relief of the
symptoms described at the outset. Nor do we prescribe radical
surgery. Rather, like the old country doctor, having none of the
miracle drugs available, we venture the opinion that the patient
can be cured by the tender loving care furnished by members
of the family. The legal profession must gather around and help
to provide a remedy for our ailing federal appellate system.
17 Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System,
44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901 (1971).
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